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This paper engages with biopoetic paradigms for understanding creativity and, especially, poetry. While
acknowledging the tensions that have long existed between the sciences and the humanities, this paper argues
that the work of the US sociobiologist Ellen Dissanayake provides exciting opportunities for rethinking poetic
praxis that extend Romantic paradigms. Dissanayake’s theory of poetry’s origins in ‘motherese’, the emotionally
charged and dynamic language through which mothers or caregivers engage their children, is of particular
interest. Dissanayake’s conception of poetry’s genesis provides us with a new way of theorising two key features
of poetic creativity—emotionalism and inarticulacy—that resonate with a Romantic phenomenology of poetic
praxis as well as with this author’s experience of writing poetry.
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Introduction
It was almost 200 years ago that Mary Shelley gave us the famous Romantic creative genius, Victor
Frankenstein, and yet this ambiguous character continues to signify a model of creative practice that has
considerable traction, particularly when it comes to poetry. Picture Doctor Frankenstein, the poet-academic,
engaged in a passionate and arcane act of creativity in his home laboratory; his body of work enlivened by
the lightning bolt of inspiration, and productive of a shocking or defamiliarising effect; his genius
unappreciated by almost everyone—with the exception of his ‘biographer’, Richard Walton, the sympathetic
narrator of Frankenstein’s story.
Such a model of singular poetic praxis provides a particularly useful starting point for this essay, which will
revise that enduring vision of emotion-laden Romantic creativity by returning to the proverbial laboratory,
associated as it is with the disciplines of science. While it was Frankenstein’s embrace of science that
corrupted his creative vision, and while the relationship between the sciences and the humanities continues
to be fraught, emerging work in biopoetics—as it has been called—has rich potential to help us theorise
the poet’s work, particularly in relation to the emotionalism valorised by Romanticism.
Kevin Brophy’s Patterns of creativity: investigations into the sources and methods of creativity has paved the way for
such cross-disciplinary research in Australia. His study explores how the ‘glorious uselessness, excess and
creativity’ (2009: 18) of poetic praxis resembles life’s evolutionary improvisations. Brophy also examines the
limited function of consciousness when it comes to the human organism’s daily operations and, by
extension, poetic activity in provocative ways that invite further attention. However, it is the work of the
US sociobiologist Ellen Dissanayake that provides the theoretical framework for this essay. Her
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conceptualisation of creativity offers alternatives to Romanticism’s mystificatory scenarios when it comes to
understanding how and why it is that we poets do the things we do.
This paper will primarily investigate Dissanayake’s identification of the origins of poetry in ‘motherese’, the
emotional, rhythmic, patterned and performative language that mothers or caregivers intuitively employ in
communicating with infants. While Dissanayake’s interest lies in the ways in which motherese might
demonstrate art’s role as a ‘biological adaptation’ (2007: 2), her theory of poetry’s genesis in the context of
an inarticulate but emotion-filled experience of the world is of primary interest to me. This is because
Dissanayake’s model of biopoetics highlights the importance of emotional intensity and inarticulacy to
poetic practice in ways that resonate with my experience of writing poetry.
Dissanayake’s work, of course, also resonates with Julia Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic (the preverbal state
of infantile and creative experience), DW Winnicott’s concept of play (which similarly links mother-infant
practices with creativity), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s investigation of language as embodying feeling—all
potential areas for further exploration. Dissanayake’s theory of poetry’s origins in the emotional language of
motherese also evokes Romanticism’s celebration of feeling over reason. William Wordsworth characterised
poetry as ‘the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling’ in his famous preface to Lyrical ballads (1991
[1798]: 246), while John Keats advocated ‘a Life of Sensations rather than of Thoughts’ (1958: 185). Such
connections will be touched on later in this paper, but they also provide another undoubtedly fruitful
avenue for elaboration elsewhere. This paper, however, will be content to begin research in this exciting
area of biopoetics by carefully contextualising and exploring Dissanayake’s theorisation of poetry in terms
of emotion and inarticulacy, before concluding with some phenomenological reflections on poetic praxis,
derived from Romanticism as well as from my own experience.
On interdisciplinarity: negotiating the ‘two cultures’
Interdisciplinarity between the sciences and the arts has steadily increased in recent times, with humanities
scholars intervening in the ‘objective’ work of the sciences, and the sciences, as this paper argues, offering
provocative empirical paradigms for conceptualising the arts. However, the relationship between the sciences
and the humanities—as in Shelley’s Frankenstein, which depicts a monster deranged by science but given
humanity by poetry—has been marked by significant rivalries and tensions.
Daniel Cordle identifies three historical moments in the contemporary quarrel between the so-called ‘two
cultures’ (1999). Coinciding with the universalisation of state education in England, there was Matthew
Arnold’s and T.H. Huxley’s 1880 dispute over the virtues of a schooling in the humanities versus a scientific
education. The poet Arnold famously promoted the humanising influence of cultural learning. In the 1950s
and 60s, CP Snow and FR Leavis continued the debate. Snow, a scientist and a writer, published The two
cultures (1959), in which he elevated science above the humanities, which had traditionally claimed greater
prestige and greater access to knowledge about human nature. For Snow, writers and literary intellectuals
were egotists and ‘natural Luddites’ (1964: 22), whereas science offered the possibility of genuinely
authoritative and progressive thinking.
Then there were the so-called ‘science wars’ of the 1990s in the US, triggered by the interpenetration of the
‘two cultures’, as scholars began to interrogate the authority of scientific knowledge. Donna Haraway’s
Primate visions: gender, race, and nature in the world of modern science (1989) called attention to the patriarchal bias
of primatology, questioning the assumption behind an experiment, for instance, that removed males from a
group of rhesus macaques to demonstrate that group’s reliance on males. Haraway asked why the
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experiment had not removed the female monkeys. Aggrieved scientists responded to such criticisms with
polemical attacks on the ‘postmodern’ relativism of humanities departments. In Higher superstition: the academic
left and its quarrels with science, Paul Gross and Norman Levitt disparages science critics as a ‘gaggle of
post-everything feminists’ (1994: 37), who are irrationally inimical to objectivity and truth. As Sandra
Harding suggests, feminist scholars such as Haraway are fundamentally desirous of ‘more objective … not
less objective’ science (1996: 19), but their work has been nevertheless perceived as an attack on the
disciplinary integrity of science. The hostilities culminated in the 1996 Sokal hoax, in which Alan Sokal
wrote a parody of postmodern science criticism, accepted for publication by the peer-reviewed humanities
journal Social Text. Sokal later explained that he wanted to expose the absurdities of postmodern humanities
scholarship, targeting in particular ‘deconstructive literary theory, New Age ecology, so-called “feminist
epistemology”, extreme social-constructivist philosophy of science … [and] Lacanian psychoanalysis’ (2000:
16).
As Andrew Ross recognises, the culture wars lay behind the ‘science wars’, as they came to be known
(1996). Indeed, even earlier manifestations of the ‘two cultures’ conflict, which were articulated vis-à-vis
concerns about public education, demonstrate the ways in which the dispute between science and the
humanities has always been implicated in the cultural politics of the public sphere. An argument that seems
to be about differing methodologies is actually an argument about how people understand human
nature—and, ironically, how that understanding ought to be nurtured.
This becomes starkly apparent in the heightened tensions that have appeared around the discipline of
sociobiology, which (as the term suggests) investigates the social behaviours of animals (including human
beings) in relation to their biology. Sociobiology, particularly in its focus on the social behaviours and
biology of the human animal, has been the site of thinly disguised ideological struggle. It is also an area in
which the sciences and humanities, perhaps unsurprisingly given the inherent interdisciplinary focus of
sociobiology, appear to be most strongly converging—and most strongly conflicting.
Scientists have taken an aggressive stance, with the evolutionary sociobiologist EO Wilson, in Consilience: the
unity of knowledge, championing the triumph of the sciences over the humanities. Wilson prophesies an
inevitable future in which the humanities ‘will draw closer to the sciences and partly fuse with them’ (1999:
12). Postmodernists, ‘a rebel crew milling beneath the black flag of anarchy’ (40), irrationally holding to the
belief that science is ‘contrived mostly by European and American white males’ (42), will die out ‘like
sparks from firework explosions … in the Darwinian contest of ideas … because—simply—that is the way
the real world works’ (44).
Wilson’s vision of sociobiology, which privileges biology as the bedrock of truth and which views
contemporary society as a manifestation of our biology, has been vehemently contested from within the
ranks of science. In Not in our genes: biology, ideology, and human nature, Richard Lewontin, Steven Rose and
Leon Kamin argue that such a model of evolutionary sociobiology represents nothing more than ‘a
reductionist, biological determinist explanation of human existence’, which claims ‘that human society as we
know it is both inevitable and the result of an adaptive process’ (1984: 236). They add: ‘The general appeal
of sociobiology is in its legitimation of the status quo.’
Nevertheless, Wilson’s call for ‘consilience’ has received support from disaffected scholars within the
humanities—and, particularly, literary studies, which has been frontline in the culture wars. In Literary
Darwinism: evolution, human nature, and literature, Joseph Carroll hails the inevitable conquest of literary studies
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by sociobiology and looks forward to a future in which literary texts will be assessed not for their
ideological values but for whether or not they realistically reflect ‘human nature’ (2004). Jonathan
Gottschall, the author of Literature, science, and a new humanities, confidently declares that moving ‘closer to
the sciences in theory, method, and governing ethos’ is ‘the only responsible and attractive correction of
course … with the potential to lift the field from its morass’ (2008: 3). Providing a model of the future of
literary studies, Gottschall claims to restore ‘dignity’ to The Iliad by reading it as ‘a drama of naked apes’
(Gottschall & Sloan Wilson eds 2005: xvii).
As John Adams suggests, such examples of evolutionary sociobiology use literature as a vehicle through
which to rehearse the claim ‘that man has a human nature and it is always and everywhere the same’ (2007:
161). Committed to a particular view of human nature, such a methodology for reading texts can slide
easily from interpretation to prescription.  In The blank slate: the modern denial of human nature, for instance,
the neo-Darwinian sociobiologist Steven Pinker argues that ‘art should reflect the perennial and universal
qualities of the human species’ (2002: 418, my emphasis), with those qualities defined as peculiarly static
and enduring, despite the centrality of provisionality and transformation to the evolutionary paradigm he
embraces. It is also the case that Carroll and Gottschall, not to mention Pinker, are consistently distracted
by their concerns about left-wing postmodern relativists in ways that reveal how their interests lie less in
the value of interdisciplinarity than in politics.
In the light of the aggressiveness and reductiveness of the models of ‘consilience’ offered by
sociobiologists, other scholars in the humanities have resisted calls for interdisciplinary exchange. In
Darwinian misadventures in the humanities, Eugene Goodheart objects to sociobiological interventions in the
humanities, calling sociobiology ‘scientism rather than science’ (2007: 10). He adds: ‘The prospect of
disciplines going off in various directions, unconstrained by the demand for consilience may bring greater
rewards than the opposite and illusory prospect of the unity of all knowledge, so tantalizing to
neo-Darwinists’ (120). In Interference patterns: literary study, scientific knowledge, and disciplinary autonomy, Adams
rejects ‘methodological monism’ (2007: 134) in the specific context of literary studies. He argues that
science’s methods are ‘inapplicable’ to the study of literature, comparing interdisciplinarity to ‘negative
interference’ (15). For Adams, the humanities address ‘meaning’, whereas science addresses ‘mechanism’
(37)—returning us to a polarising Frankenstein-like framework.
This paper situates itself in the discipline of creative writing, which investigates the production of literary
texts, rather than in its cognate discipline literary studies, which is focused on the reception of literary texts—
although such distinctions are slippery, given the ways in which a writer of a text is always also its reader,
and the ways in which literary critics also attend to the material conditions around writing. In any case,
science’s interest in ‘mechanisms’ rather than ‘meanings’, if we allow that distinction to hold, is not
something that I would necessarily want to reject. After all, the ‘mechanisms’ of poetic praxis are of central
importance to my research into creative practice.  It is also the case that, while I am advocating cross-
disciplinarity, I hardly support Wilson’s grand vision of the sciences subsuming the humanities. As my
discussion of Dissanayake’s work will conclude by suggesting, the phenomenological testing of her theories
of poetry by practitioners of poetry is essential to enriching her hypothesis about creative practice.
I also share concerns about the regressive nature of neo-Darwinian evolutionary sociobiology. However, as
Dissanayake’s careful and thoughtful research in biopoetics demonstrates, Wilson et al. are not representative
of the entire discipline of sociobiology. While some practitioners in the humanities have recommended the
wholesale rejection of sociobiological paradigms, I would argue that there is no need—to use a metaphor
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that is particularly relevant to Dissanayake’s work—to throw out the baby with the bathwater.
In fact, the naive understanding of evolution espoused by some of the sociobiologists or self-proclaimed
‘literary Darwinists’ surveyed has been significantly challenged through the revisionary work of evolutionary
scientists such as Susan Oyama (2000), Lyn Margulis and Dorion Sagan. They note that ‘the neo-Darwinist
mechanistic, nonautopoeitic worldview is entirely consistent with the major myths of our dominant
civilization’ (Margulis & Sagan 1997: 276), with traditional evolutionary theory’s emphasis on masculine
competition for mating rights betraying ratiocentric, autarchic, patriarchal and capitalist ideologies. Oyama,
Margulis and Sagan, by contrast, draw attention to contingency, symbiosis, heterogeneity and struggle as the
context for evolution.  In addition, there exists strong agreement in sociobiology that humans are, as
Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson write, ‘both biological and cultural organisms’ (1985: 281). Richard
Dawkins, despite ascribing to traditional Darwinian evolutionary theory in some respects, nevertheless
describes human beings as ‘homosymbolicus’ (2006: 34); as ‘defined by a dual inheritance (341). Terence
Deacon’s The symbolic species: the co-evolution of language and the brain similarly acknowledges a dialectical
relationship between biological and cultural forces when it comes to evolution, going so far as to claim that
‘the physical changes that make us human are the incarnations, so to speak, of the process of using words’
(1997: 322). Language acquisition, he argues, made our brains bigger; it made us who we are. Dissanayake
likewise positions herself against reductionist biological visions of human nature; humans, she claims, ‘have
evolved to require culture’ (2000: 8). She continues: ‘they cannot exist in a cultureless or culture-free state’
and ‘they are born with common, cross-culturally recognized predispositions (“needs”) to acquire culture.’
Indeed, for Dissanayake, as we shall see, art can ‘fit’ humanity for survival.
There is no doubt that interdisciplinarity remains a challenge, largely as a result of the obvious
specialisation of disciplinary knowledge, but the ‘dual inheritance’ of human beings clearly demands
interdisciplinary engagement of the kind suggested by the discipline of sociobiology and the emerging area
of biopoetics. This notion of humans as both cultural and biological beings is ultimately the premise behind
the interdisciplinary methodology that I embrace in this paper, and it is as relevant to the investigation of
creative practice as to any other human endeavor. As Roger Hart suggests, our creative work occurs ‘in
response to such historically specific factors as prevailing disciplinary paradigms and cultural assumptions,
as well as such species-specific factors as the human sensorium and neurophysiology’ (1996: 35).
Dissanayake’s research into the origins of poetry in mother-infant interactions, as the below discussion will
make clear, provides a way for creative-writing scholars to reconsider their practice with the interdisciplinary
scope necessary to understanding the behavior of ‘homosymbolicus’.
Dissanayake’s ‘motherese’: poetry’s origins in emotion and inarticulacy
Dissanayake’s vision of evolution, like that of Oyama, Margulis and Sagan, is a revisionary one that contests
the patriarchal and solipsistic slant of traditional Darwinian evolutionary theory. In Art and intimacy: how the
arts began, Dissanayake conceptualises human nature in terms of ‘psychological or emotional needs that arise
from a primary capacity for mutuality’ rather than ‘competitive behavioral strategies that serve an underlying
selfishness’ (2000: 8). She argues: ‘the earliest ability of infants is to…engage in emotional communication
with others. Each of us is born with a mind—sense and emotions—that moves us to seek and engage in
intimacy with others before we do anything else’ (10).
Dissanayake identifies art as another fundamental ‘need’ alongside the requirement for intimacy. Indeed, she
suggests that the need for love and art, which she calls ‘mutuality’ and ‘elaborating’, go hand in glove, with
art facilitating bonding (184). That integral connection between love and art is everywhere apparent, most
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obviously in religion and romance, but it can be felt even in the experience of being entranced by a TV
show or pop music. Love and art, as Dissanayake points out, are commonly and similarly experienced as
transformative forces with ‘the power to grasp us utterly and transport us from ordinary sweating, flailing,
imperfect “reality” to an indescribable realm where we know and seem known by the sensibility of another,
united in a continuing present, our usual isolation momentarily effaced’ (4).
Dissanayake sees the first evidence of the mutual forces of love and art in ‘baby talk’ or ‘motherese’, which
she alleges ‘is not the trivial or inane pastime that it might superficially seem but, rather, a cradle in which
nascent psychosocial capacities can emerge and be developed’ (2001: 336). She describes motherese as the
‘mutual multimedia ritual performance’ (2000: 29) that emerges in the first months of infancy and
motherhood—or between a young infant and any caregiver—and that achieves its effects ‘through
fundamentally aesthetic means’: ‘stylization (formalization or simplification), repetition, exaggeration, and
elaboration in visual, vocal, and gestural modalities’ (2001: 336). During this multimedia performance,
mother (caregiver) and infant collaborate in a routine of sound-making and face-pulling, the mirror neurons
in their brains compelling them to imitate one another’s sounds and expressions so that they achieve what
Dissanayake describes as an ‘emotional communion’ (2000: 6).
This leads us to an important clarification: for Dissanayake, love and art, like the condition of infancy from
which they arise, are ‘intrinsically nonverbal’ (6). Love and art are not about cognitive value or ‘meaning’ in
the strict or narrow sense of those terms. Baby talk, Dissanayake writes, ‘has nothing to do with the
exchange of verbal information about the world and everything to do with participating in an impromptu
expression of accord and a narrative of feelings’ (45). In Dissanayake’s view, while language ‘will eventually
become also an instrument of symbolic reasoning and intellectual analysis’, it first and foremost, as
motherese shows us, ‘expresses emotional needs of mutuality and belonging’ (45-6). In fact, Dissanayake
argues that the emotional role of art remains paramount even in culture’s more mature manifestations, with
cultural ‘ceremonies or rituals’—from church services to cinema viewing and concerts—doing for a society’s
members ‘what mothers naturally do for babies: engage their interest, involve them in a shared rhythmic
pulse, and thereby instill feelings of closeness and communion’ (64).
Dissanayake’s understanding of human nature as intrinsically motivated to seek mutuality through art might
seem Pollyannaish. Pinker is certainly critical of what he describes as utopian ‘left-wing innatists’ (2002:
305). However, Dissanayake’s emphasis on empathy and cooperation provides a view of human evolution
that seems less naive than traditional accounts privileging masculine competition for breeding rights.
Dissanayake’s work ultimately acknowledges how much more there is at stake to human reproductive
success and survival—to ‘fitness’—than rivalry between men for mates. Procreation may be of initial
importance, but successful reproduction, as Dissnayake’s work highlights, involves something more sustained
and significant: parenting. This is where art comes in, facilitating bonding in a virtual, performative space
through the triggering and sharing of heightened emotion. It is also the case that, when it comes to
understanding that subject dear to Neo-Darwinists, human nature, Dissanayake’s focus on ‘the earliest
months of individual infancy and … the pre-Paleolithic infancy of the human species’ (2000: 6) makes more
sense than focusing exclusively on the behaviour of grown males.
Nevertheless, cruder models of biopoetics continue to rehearse the argument that, much as male peacocks
allegedly produce their elaborate tail feathers to attract plainer females, men produce luxurious art in order
to win the attention of fertile women. In The art instinct: beauty, pleasure, and human evolution, Denis Dutton
argues that it is ‘sexual selection’ that ‘explains the will of human beings to charm and interest each other’
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(2009: 163). Art, he argues, is not about sociality (223)—about mothers and children—because ‘sexual
selection … undermines the communal spirit as having an intrinsic role in the arts’ (226). Pinker, in The
language instinct, explicitly dismisses the significance of motherese to cultural behaviour, taking exception to
the idea that mothers might be responsible for even teaching children language. He argues: ‘children
deserve most of the credit for the language they acquire’ (1994: 40).
Dissanayake, though, is not alone in redirecting attention to women and infants (whom Darwin essentially
viewed as less evolved and less relevant than men), and in understanding art as a ‘biological adaptation’
(2007: 2) within that social context. In Mothers and others: the evolutionary origins of mutual understanding (2009),
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy likewise views the relationship between mothers (or other caregivers) and infants as
relevant to the evolutionary ‘fitness’ of human beings. Blaffer Hrdy also argues that empathy (emotion) and
‘artistic’ engagement are central to that mother-infant bond. Bryan Boyd, in On the origins of stories: evolution,
cognition, and fiction, like Dissanayake, recognises art’s origins in the systems of ‘mutual delight’ (2009: 98)
generated between mothers and infants, as well as in the ways we are ‘wired for emotional contagion’ (163).
However, Boyd’s study of storytelling is ultimately less interested in the emotional value than the cognitive
utility of that particular art form. By contrast, as we have seen, the affective dimension of cultural
expression is of primary importance to Dissanayake. Motherese, as the first manifestation of art behavior,
demonstrates that it is the ‘wish to share emotional experience that motivates early vocalization’ rather than
‘the instrumental need to request or name things’ (45).
While there is, as Gemma Corradi Fiumara reminds us, a Cartesian tradition of viewing emotions as forces
that ‘cloud the vision of the intellect’ (2001: 37), emotions have, in both the humanities and the sciences,
undergone something of a radical reevaluation in recent times. The so-called ‘affective turn’ has undermined
longstanding attempts to separate intellect and feeling, as well as the traditional privileging of the former
over the latter. Feelings are now recognised as playing an important—even primordial—role in art
appreciation and the construction of knowledge (about danger, for instance). The neuroscientist Antonio
Damasio, working from a concept of embodied consciousness, understands feeling as nothing less than ‘the
backdrop for the mind, and, more specifically, the foundation for the elusive entity we designate as self ’
(1999: 30). The self is ‘a felt core self ’ that is ‘renewed again and again thanks to anything that comes from
outside the brain into its sensory machinery or anything that comes from the brain’s memory stores
towards sensory, motor, or autonomic recall’ (172). It seems that, to revise Descartes’ maxim, ‘I feel
therefore I am’.
When it comes to the expression of that feeling and felt self, the phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty suggested
well before Dissanayake that language comes not from some kind of abstract form of cognition but from
feeling (1976: 235). Using the word ‘sleet’ as an example, Merleau-Ponty argues that
the word’s meaning is not compounded of a certain number of physical characteristics belonging to
the object; it is first and foremost the aspect taken on by the object in human experience, for
example my wonder in the face of these hard, then friable, then melting pellets falling ready-made
from the sky (403).
As Corradi Fiumara writes, language is ‘an affective reality in which we live and operate’ (2001: 65).
Motherese—and poetry—as Dissanayake suggests, are the art forms that arguably most clearly demonstrate
this.
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In ‘Aesthetic incunabula’ Dissanyake engages in an explicit and careful comparison of motherese and poetry.
Indeed, she provocatively but convincingly analyses a transcript of baby talk in terms of poetic devices such
as stanza, tone, theme, hyperbole, parallelism, elaboration, rhyme, and repetition (2001: 339-340). While
Dissanayake’s interest is ultimately in the ways in which motherese provides ‘the raw ingredients—the
aesthetic incunabula—of adult aesthetic behavior and response’ generally (343), I would like to focus on the
ways in which motherese coincides with poetry specifically. Indeed, I would like to use the concluding
pages of this paper to explore how Dissanayake’s understanding of the origins of poetry in motherese might
inform understanding of emotion and inarticulacy as central to poetry—in ways embraced by the Romantics
and as exemplified by my own practice.
Dissanayake’s motherese and poetic praxis: Phenomenological testing
I do not believe that I am being overly ambitious or presumptuous in asserting that inarticulacy and
emotion might be seen as germane, if not central, to poetry and poetic praxis. After all, poetry might be
defined as a type of language that generally relies on what might be called ‘feeling effects’, which is to say
that poetry is typically associated with connotative or suggestive, rather than denotative or instrumentalist,
kinds of expression. Poetry is also attuned to the ‘felt’ dimensions of language apparent in its rhythms and
rhymes. Indeed, in its Romantic and post-Romantic lyric form, poetry is understood to be the narcissistic
expression of the ‘felt I’ that Damasio evokes as the experience of embodied consciousness—although
those allegedly narcissistic attempts at expression nevertheless assume, as Dissanayake would argue, the
presence of a ‘Virtual Mother’ (2000: 48), an audience ready to receive, recognise, mirror, and respond. All
of this is to say that poetry, as the common complaint of students articulates, is often not primarily about
conveying a rational sense of things—although it can, of course, adopt such approaches when it chooses.
Indeed, poetry is a frequent—even formalised—response to experiences of emotional intensity that are
difficult to cognitively process and articulate, such as love, pain, trauma or grief. Poetry—with its
mobilisation of ‘feeling effects’, suggestion, rhyme, and musicality—becomes an intuitive or self-consciously
employed resource for expression during ‘feeling events’ that can compel subjects to inhabit an infant-like
state characterised by emotion and languagelessness. In fact, language and movement are connected in
scientific theories of language development and deployment, such that rhythm and rhyme in verse become
dynamic enablers of expression. If we are to broaden and de-professionalise our understanding of poetry’s
practitioners, we can see how poetry provides a useful expressive tool in various contexts, such as the
teenager’s angst-ridden use of poetry or the griever’s turn to verse (an outpouring of which was witnessed
after the traumatic event of 9/11.) Poetry, in other words, can provide a forum for the unspeakable feelings
of the body to be expressed. Poetry allows poets, however that category might be conceived, to ‘feel’ their
way into expressing bodily states that do not give themselves easily to expression.
There are, of course, different styles of poetry and various compositional methods when it comes to writing
poetry—one of those being to strip language of its emotionality, as we see in the deliberately ‘flat’ cognitive
games of some modernist and postmodernist verse. Notably, however, such movements comprise reactions
against Romanticism, and it is with Romantic notions of creativity that Dissanayake’s theory of poetry’s
origins in motherese resonates most strongly.
The Romantics might be said to have been primarily concerned with conveying a deeply felt, inarticulate
experience of embodiment vis-à-vis the natural world. In her study of Keats, Shahidha Bari talks about the
preeminence of feeling to Keats’s work—‘the peculiar phenomenality of Keats’s poetry’ (2012: xvii)—where
feeling ‘designates something that is non-conceptual, or not “known” … but is “felt” as surely as it were’.
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Feeling, she argues, ‘then fastens onto thought’. Keats’s poetry, Bari argues, requires a form of reading that
is inspired by the emotional manner of writing. It is a style of reading attentive to
the manner in which poems work upon the senses, the way metricality manipulates one’s breath and
the shape that words take in the mouth; it registers, too, other … felt effects, like the figurative
weight that images sometimes place upon us or the fluency with which some syntactical
constructions move through our understanding. (2012: xvii)
In other words, the emotional composition of the poem—using the embodied techniques of rhythm and
rhythm that assist expression—constructs a ‘Virtual Mother’ or a reader who will perform an empathetic
emotion-laden response that mirrors and affirms the poet’s own.
My own experience of writing poetry likewise resembles this process. It involves a state of intense feeling
and of being dumbstruck—struck into a language-less state—before my particular subject. This is perhaps
where the proverbial fear of the ‘blank page’ might present an obstacle, but that embodied and inarticulate
condition is nevertheless infused with the desire to communicate the ‘feeling event’. This emotional and
nonverbal state is not necessarily one into which I am haplessly thrust; it is a state that I can
self-consciously choose to inhabit, because I know it is valuable for my poetic praxis, allowing me to escape
conventional ratiocentric understanding. Indeed, it is the epistemological basis for the defamiliarising acts of
my poetry. The construction of the poem from that state of emotion and inarticulacy is painstaking and
difficult, but I feel my way into the words—in the sense that Merleau-Ponty has described—and the word
choice can be facilitated by strategies such as rhyme and rhythm. The activity of writing poetry might very
well have narcissistic elements, but it is also always directed towards Dissanayake’s ‘Virtual Mother’, an ideal
reader who I expect will be there, simply because I am a human being constantly attuned to the
possibilities of mutuality. Indeed, through the poem I not only perform my emotional experience but call
for its intimate recreation and sharing.
In The midnight disease, the neurologist Alice Flaherty generalises that ‘creativity has been more closely linked
to mood instability than to cognitive traits such as high IQ’ (2005: 33). She continues: ‘even in normal
writing, the neurobiology of mood and the limbic drive to write may be equally or more important than the
purely cognitive skills taught in most writing courses’ (33). Flaherty’s allusion to the ratiocentric pedagogies
of writing courses provides food for further thought. However, her study also highlights poetry’s
fundamental reliance on what Wordsworth describes, in ‘Lines, written a few miles above Tintern Abbey’, as
‘the language of the sense’ (1991 [1798]: 116). While Flaherty’s title suggests that moodful writing might be
associated with ‘disease’ or pathology, Dissanayake’s approach allows us to theorise poetic creativity in ways
that are healthful and helpful. Indeed, if we conceptualise poetry as foundational to emotional expression
and empathetic sharing, we begin to see poetry’s role in our culture in a new and vital light.
Conclusion
This paper, in embracing a sociobiological paradigm for understanding creativity, does not mean to suggest
that scientific knowledge should triumph over poetic experience. As my discussion above hopefully
suggests, the phenomenological testing by writers of biopoetic models for understanding creativity is
essential to their enrichment—and, indeed, to their relevance for creative writing as a discipline, given that
sociobiology is interested in artistic behavior only insofar as it manifests evidence of biological adaptiveness.
I do, however, strongly believe that poetry, as a human activity inevitably informed by biological and
cultural forces, requires cross-disciplinary attention.
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Poetry is also an activity that, like other human behaviors, manifests a great deal of complexity and
heterogeneity, and so I do not imagine that poetry can be unilaterally or homogenously ‘explained’ by
Dissanayake’s theory or by my particular focus on emotion and inarticulacy. I have adverted to various
other avenues for exploration when it comes to the relevance of Dissanayake’s theory—and there is always,
of course, the possibility of other equally and indeed simultaneously valuable theories of poetic praxis.
Scientists and poets alike, as Gillian Beer warns, have a tendency to ‘discover in the universe the patterns
that our minds have put there. The utmost resourcefulness and probity of language are needed, both by
scientists and poets, to outwit the tendency of description to stabilize a foreknown world and to curtail
discovery’ (1987: 56). Thus, while I might have begun this paper by being critical of the Frankensteinian
model of the poet, I would like to conclude by emphasising this paper’s spirit of Frankensteinian
experimentation.
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